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Abstract
Though commentators frequently warn about “echo chambers,” little is known about the volume
or slant of political misinformation people consume online, the effects of social media and fact-
checking on exposure, or its effects on behavior. We evaluate these questions for the websites
publishing factually dubious content often described as “fake news.” Survey and web traffic data
from the 2016U.S. presidential campaign show that Trump supporters weremost likely to visit these
websites, which often spread via Facebook. However, these sites made up a small share of people’s
information diets on average and were largely consumed by a subset of Americans with strong
preferences for pro-attitudinal information. These results suggest that widespread speculation about
the prevalence of exposure to untrustworthy websites has been overstated.
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Introduction
“Fake news” remains one of the most widely debated aspects of the 2016 U.S. presidential
election. Articles from untrustworthy websites that featured factually dubious claims about
politics and the campaign were shared by millions of people on Facebook1. Post-election surveys
indicated these claims were often widely believed2,3. Some journalists and researchers have even
suggested that “fake news” may be responsible for Donald Trump’s victory4–7.
These developments raise significant democratic concerns about the quality of the information
that voters receive. However, little is known scientifically about the consumption of so-called
“fake news” from these untrustworthy websites or how it relates to political behavior. In this
study, we provide comprehensive individual-level analysis of the correlates and consequences of
untrustworthy website exposure in the real world. Our analysis combines a dataset of pre-election
survey data and web traffic histories from a national sample of Americans with an extensive list of
untrustworthy websites. These data enable us to conduct analyses that are not possible using
post-election self-reports of exposure3, aggregate-level data on visits to untrustworthy websites8
or behavioral data that lack candidate preference information9.
We report five principal findings. First, consistent with theories of selective exposure, people
differentially consume false information that reinforces their political views. However, fewer than
half of all Americans visited these untrustworthy websites, which represented approximately 6%
of people’s online news diet during the study period (95% CI: 5.1%–6.7%). Consumption of news
from these sites was instead heavily concentrated among a small subset of people — 62% of the
visits we observe came from the 20% of Americans with the most conservative information diets.
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Third, we show that Facebook played a central role in spreading content from untrustworthy
websites relative to other platforms. Fourth, fact-checks of articles published by these outlets
almost never reached their target audience. Finally, we examine whether consumption of factually
dubious news affected other forms of political behavior. We find that untrustworthy website
consumption does not crowd out consumption of other hard news. However, our results about the
relationship between untrustworthy website consumption and both voter turnout and vote choice
are statistically imprecise; we can only rule out very large effects.
Theory and expectations
Alarm about “fake news” reflects concerns about rising partisanship and pervasive social media
usage, which have raised fears that “echo chambers” and “filter bubbles” could amplify
misinformation and shield people from counter-attitudinal information10,11. Relatively little is
known, however, about the extent to which selective exposure can distort the factual information
that people consume and promote exposure to false or misleading factual claims — a key question
for U.S. democracy.
We therefore evaluate the extent to which people engage in selective exposure to untrustworthy
websites that reinforce their partisan predispositions during a general election campaign. Studies
show that people tend to prefer congenial information, including political news, when given the
choice12–15. We therefore expect Americans to prefer factually dubious news that favors the
candidate they support. However, behavioral data show that only a subset of Americans have
heavily skewed media consumption patterns16–18. We therefore disaggregate the public by the
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overall skew in their information diets to observe whether consumption of news from
untrustworthy websites mirrors people’s broader tendencies toward selective exposure.
We also seek to understand how false and misleading information disseminates online. The speed
and reach of social media and the lack of fact-checking make it an ideal vehicle for transmitting
misinformation19. Studies indicate that social media can spread false claims rapidly20 and increase
selective exposure to attitude-consistent news and information21. These tendencies may be
exacerbated by design and platform features such as algorithmic feeds and community
structures22. In this study, we test whether social media usage increases exposure to news from
untrustworthy websites, a source of misinformation about politics that is attitude-consistent for
many partisans. We compare the role that social media plays compared to other web platforms
such as Google or webmail.
However, the effects of exposure to this factually dubious content may be attenuated if those who
are exposed to it also receive corrective information. Fact-checks are relatively widely read and
associated with greater political knowledge23. Though some studies find that people sometimes
resist corrective information in news stories24,25, meta-analyses indicate that exposure to
fact-checks and other forms of corrective information generally increase belief accuracy26–28.
Fact-checks could thus help to counter the pernicious effects of exposure to untrustworthy
websites. In the real world, fact-checks may fail to reach the audience that is exposed to the claims
they target29. We therefore examine the relationship between exposure to factually dubious news
and fact-check consumption. These analyses complement existing experimental fact-checking
research by capturing exposure to misinformation and fact-checks in the wild30.
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Finally, we examine previous conjectures that exposure to so-called “fake news” affects other
types of political behavior — hard news consumption, vote choice, and voter turnout. Most
notably, a recent study claims that “false information did have a substantial impact” on the
election based on the association in a post-election survey between expressed belief in anti-Hillary
Clinton “fake news” and self-reported support for Donald Trump among self-reported supporters
of Barack Obama in 20127. However, this research design is correlational and relies on
post-election self-reports; it cannot establish causality. Moreover, previous research offers limited
support for these conjectures. First, news consumption habits are likely to be ingrained and related
to traits such as partisan strength and political interest31,32. Untrustworthy websites are unlikely to
displace people’s normal information diets. In addition, the effects of brief exposure to persuasive
messages have been found to be small in partisan election campaigns. A meta-analysis of 49 field
experiments finds that the average effect of personal and impersonal forms of campaign contact is
zero33. Even the effects of television ads are extremely limited: just one to three people out of
10,000 who are exposed to an additional ad change their vote choice to support the candidate in
question by one estimate34. However, exposure could also affect the election by helping to
mobilize likely supporters to turn out to vote (or, alternatively, by discouraging likely opponents
from voting). Evidence does suggest that television advertising can shift the partisan composition
of the electorate34. Exposure to online content that strongly supports a candidate or attacks their
opponent could potentially have similar effects.
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Results
Total untrustworthy website consumption We estimate that 44.3% of Americans age 18 or
older visited an article on an untrustworthy website during our study period, which covered the
final weeks of the 2016 election campaign (95% CI: 40.8%–47.7%). In total, articles on these
factually dubious websites represented an average of 5.9% of all the articles Americans read on
sites focusing on hard news topics during this period (95% CI: 5.1%–6.7%). The content people
read on these sites was heavily skewed by partisanship and ideology — articles on untrustworthy
conservative websites represented 4.6% of people’s news diets (95% CI: 3.8%–5.3%) compared
to only 0.6% for liberal sites (95% CI: 0.5%–0.8%).
Selective exposure to untrustworthy websites We observe stark differences by candidate
support and information diet in the frequency and slant of untrustworthy website visits, suggesting
powerful selective exposure effects. First, people who indicated in the survey that they supported
Trump were far more likely to visit untrustworthy websites — especially those that are
conservative and thus very likely pro-Trump — than those who indicated they were Clinton
supporters. Among Trump supporters, 56.7% read at least one article from an untrustworthy
conservative website (95% CI: 51.7%–61.8%) compared with 27.7% of Clinton supporters (95%
CI: 23.1%–32.4%). Consumption of articles from untrustworthy liberal websites was much lower,
though also somewhat divided by candidate support. Clinton supporters were modestly more
likely to have visited untrustworthy liberal websites (23.0%, 95% CI: 18.8%–27.2%) than Trump
supporters (10.7%, 95% CI: 8.1%–13.3%). These differences in the proportions of supporters
who were exposed to attitude-consistent untrustworthy news are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Selective exposure to untrustworthy websites. Means and 95% confidence intervals
calculated using survey weights for October 7–November 14, 2016 among YouGov Pulse panel
members who supported Clinton or Trump (N = 2,170 for binary exposure measure; N = 2,016
for information diet). The denominator for information consumption includes total exposure to
those sites as well as the number of pages visited on websites classified as focusing on hard news
topics (excluding Amazon, Twitter, and YouTube). Respondents who did not visit any of these sites
are excluded from the information diet graph.
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The differences by candidate preference that we observe in untrustworthy consumption are even
more pronounced when expressed in terms of the composition of the overall news diets of each
group. When we consider pages visited on websites that Bakshy et al.21 classified as hard news
(excluding Amazon, Twitter, and YouTube) as well as untrustworthy websites that Grinberg et
al.35 classify as liberal or conservative, we again observe significant differences in consumption by
candidate preference. Untrustworthy conservative websites made up 11.0% of the news diet of
Trump supporters (95% CI: 9.2%–12.8%) compared to only 0.8% among Clinton supporters
(95% CI: 0.6%–1.1%). The pattern was again reversed but of lesser magnitude for untrustworthy
liberal websites: 1.1% of pages on hard news topics for Clinton supporters (95% CI: 0.7%–1.5%)
versus 0.4% for Trump supporters (95% CI: 0.2%–0.6%).
The differences we observe in visits to untrustworthy liberal and conservative websites by
candidate support are statistically significant in OLS models even after we adjust for standard
demographic and political covariates, including a standard scale measuring general political
knowledge (Table 1). For both a binary measure of exposure and a measure of the share of the
respondent’s information diet, Trump supporters were disproportionately more likely to consume
untrustworthy conservative news and less likely to consume untrustworthy liberal news relative to
Clinton supporters, supporting a selective exposure account. Older Americans (age 60 and older)
also consumed more information from untrustworthy websites irrespective of slant conditional on
these covariates.
To analyze which specific types of news consumers were most likely to visit untrustworthy
websites, we divide users into deciles depending on the slant of their information diet, which we
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Figure 2: Visits to untrustworthy websites by media diet slant decile. Means and 95% confidence
intervals calculated using survey weights for October 7–November 14, 2016 among YouGov Pulse
panel members whose average media diet slant could be calculated (N = 2,422 for binary exposure
measure; N = 2,334 for information diet). The denominator for information consumption includes
total exposure to those sites as well as the number of pages visited on websites classified as focusing
on hard news topics (excluding Amazon, Twitter, and YouTube). Respondents who did not visit any
of these sites are excluded from the information diet graph.
compute as the mean slant weighted by pageviews among the websites they visit for which data
are available from Bakshy et al.21 (which estimate website slant based on differential Facebook
sharing by self-identified liberals versus conservatives). Figure 2 shows how consumption of
untrustworthy websites varies across these ten deciles, which range from the 10% of respondents
who visit the most liberal sites to the 10% who visit the most conservative sites (on average).
The proportion of the sample that visited at least one untrustworthy conservative site ranges
inconsistently from 31–48% across the first eight deciles of selective exposure from liberal to
conservative, but rises steeply to 59.6% in the second most conservative decile (95% CI:
48.4%–70.9%) and 84.0% in the most conservative decile (95% CI: 75.2%–92.8%). The total
amount of untrustworthy news consumption is also vastly greater in the top deciles; news from
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untrustworthy conservative websites made up 18.1% of news consumption among the second
most conservative decile (95% CI: 14.1%–22.1%) and 20.9% among the 10% of Americans with
the most conservative information diets (95% CI: 16.6%–25.3%). These totals, which represent
an average of 25 and 91 articles, respectively, are dramatically higher than those observed in the
rest of the population (0.3–6.2% across the eight remaining deciles; see Supplementary Table 8
for corresponding statistical results). In total, 62% of all page-level traffic to untrustworthy
websites observed in our data during the study period came from the 20% of news consumers with
the most conservative information diets.
Engagement with untrustworthy websites Due to the nature of the web consumption data
analyzed in this study, we do not have direct measures of whether respondents carefully read
articles they visited on untrustworthy websites or believed the claims in those articles. However,
auxiliary evidence suggests that respondents engaged with the articles they visited and were
vulnerable to believing the claims that they contained.
First, we observe little evidence that most respondents immediately closed articles from
untrustworthy websites or otherwise failed to engage with them meaningfully. In fact, they spent
more time on pages from these websites than on articles from websites focusing on hard news
topics. On average, respondents spent over a minute on articles from untrustworthy websites (64.2
seconds), about two-thirds of a minute on articles from domains that focus on hard news topics
(42.1 seconds), and about one quarter of a minute on articles from other sites (24.2 seconds).
In addition, the respondents who visited untrustworthy websites scored lower on a validated
measure of cognitive reflection that has been shown to predict greater accuracy in distinguishing
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false from real news headlines. People who perform worse on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
are less able to distinguish between false and real headlines36,37. Among the subset of respondents
who completed the CRT in separate YouGov surveys, we observe no association between CRT
scores and untrustworthy conservative website consumption. But as Figure 3 suggests, Trump
supporters who score in the top quintile on the CRT (at least two of the three questions correct)
consumed less news from these websites as a share of their information diet than those who got no
questions correct (p=.04; see Supplementary Table 7). These results suggest that people who got
the most news from untrustworthy websites were also more likely to believe it. (Corresponding
analyses for untrustworthy liberal websites, which respondents were much less likely to visit, are
provided in the Supplementary Information.)
Gateways to untrustworthy websites How do people come to visit an untrustworthy website?
Since the election, many have argued that social media, especially Facebook, played an integral
role in exposing people to untrustworthy news1,3, 9. While we cannot directly observe the referring
site or application for the URLs visited by our survey panel, we can indirectly estimate the role
Facebook played in two ways.
First, we group respondents who supported either Clinton or Trump into three terciles of observed
Facebook usage. The results, which are analyzed statistically in Supplementary Table 10, show a
dramatic association between Facebook usage and untrustworthy website exposure. Visits to
untrustworthy conservative websites increased from 16.5% among Clinton supporters who do not
use Facebook or use it relatively little (95% CI: 8.9%–24.1%) to 24.8% in the middle tercile (95%
CI: 17.3%–32.2%) and 45.7% among the Clinton supporters who use Facebook most (95% CI:
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Figure 3: Consumption of untrustworthy conservative websites by CRT score and candidate
preference. Means and 95% confidence intervals calculated using survey weights for October 7–
November 14, 2016 among YouGov Pulse panel members who supported Clinton or Trump (N =
772 for binary exposure measure; N = 711 for information diet). The denominator for information
consumption includes total exposure to those sites as well as the number of pages visited onwebsites
classified as focusing on hard news topics (excluding Amazon, Twitter, and YouTube). Respondents
who did not visit any of these sites are excluded from the information diet graph. “Medium” and
“high” CRT scores indicate respondents who got one or more than one question correct on the
Cognitive Reflection Test (22% and 20%, respectively).
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36.2%–55.1%). The increase is similar among Trump supporters, for whom visit rates increased
from 39.6% in the lowest third of the Facebook distribution (95% CI: 30.2%–49.0%) to 51.5% in
the middle third (95% CI: 42.8%–60.1%) and 74.4% in the upper third (95% CI: 66.7%–82.2%).
We observe similar patterns for visits to untrustworthy liberal websites and for exposure levels as
a share of respondents’ information diets.
Second, following an approach used in prior research, we can make a more direct inference about
the role of Facebook by examining the URLs visited by a respondent immediately prior to visiting
an untrustworthy website18. As Figure 4 demonstrates, Facebook was among the three previous
sites visited by respondents in the prior thirty seconds for 15.1% of the articles from
untrustworthy news websites we observe in our web data. By contrast, Facebook appears in the
comparable prior URL set for only 5.9% of articles on websites classified as hard news (excluding
Amazon, Twitter, and YouTube). This pattern of differential Facebook visits immediately prior to
untrustworthy website visits is not observed for Google (3.3% untrustworthy news versus 6.2%
hard news) or Twitter (1.0% untrustworthy versus 1.5% hard news) and exceeds what we observe
for webmail providers such as Gmail (9.5% untrustworthy versus 5.4% hard news). Our results
demonstrate that Facebook was a key vector of distribution for untrustworthy websites.
The problem of fact-checking mismatch The most prominent journalistic response to “fake
news” from untrustworthy websites and other forms of misleading or false information is
fact-checking, which has attracted a growing audience in recent years. We found that one in four
respondents (25.3%; 95% CI: 22.5%–28.2%) visited a fact-checking article from a national
fact-checking website at least once during the study period.
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Figure 4: Referrers to untrustworthy news websites and other sources. Means and 95% confi-
dence intervals calculated using survey weights for October 7–November 14, 2016 among YouGov
Pulse panel members (N = 2,525). The denominator for information consumption includes total
exposure to those sites as well as the number of pages visited on websites classified as focusing on
hard news topics (excluding Amazon, Twitter, and YouTube). Respondents who did not visit any of
these sites are excluded from the information diet graph. Facebook, Google, Twitter, or a webmail
provider such as Gmail were identified as a referrer if they appeared within the last three URLs














Figure 5: Fact-check and untrustworthy website visits. Means and 95% confidence intervals
calculated using survey weights for October 7–November 14, 2016 among YouGov Pulse panel
members (N = 2,525). Fact-check exposure is measured as a visit to PolitiFact, the Washington
Post Fact Checker, Factcheck.org, or Snopes.
Recent evidence suggests that this new form of journalism can help inform voters25. However,
fact-checking may not effectively reach people who have encountered the false claims it debunks.
As Figure 5 illustrates, fewer than half of the 44.3% of Americans who visited an untrustworthy
website during the study period also saw any fact-check from one of the dedicated fact-checking
websites (18.6%; 95% CI: 16.1%–21.1%).
More specifically, only three of the 111 respondents (2.7%) who read one or more articles from
untrustworthy websites that could be matched by Allcott and Gentzkow3 or Grinberg et al.35 to a
negative fact-check also read the fact-check debunking the article in question. Searching for
additional information more generally also appears to be extremely rare. Google appears among
the first three URLs visited in the thirty seconds after a visit for only 2.0% of visits to
untrustworthy websites among Clinton/Trump supporters compared to 4.0% for hard news
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website visits and 3.9% for all other website visits.
Relationship to news consumption, vote choice, and turnout Observers have suggested that
news from untrustworthy websites is displacing hard news consumption38 or that it changed the
outcome of the 2016 election4–7. We evaluate both claims.
First, we do not observe evidence that consumption of news from untrustworthy websites crowds
out consumption of information from other sources of hard news. Those who consume the most
hard news tend to consume the most information from untrustworthy websites (in other words,
they appear to be complements, not substitutes). For instance, when we divide the population into
terciles by total hard news consumption, we find that the proportion of Trump supporters who
visited untrustworthy conservative websites increases from 30.9% in the lowest tercile (95% CI:
23.8%–37.9%) to 67.0% in the middle tercile (95% CI: 58.3%–75.6%) and 79.8% in the high
tercile (95% CI: 71.8%–87.7%). This increase is statistically significant (see Supplementary
Table 12).
To further verify that news from untrustworthy websites does not crowd out hard news
consumption, we compare hard news consumption among respondents for whom online traffic
data is also available from a separate February/March 2015 study using a variant of a
difference-in-differences approach. Hard news consumption increased substantially from the 2015
study to the 2016 study among those who we know consumed any untrustworthy websites in 2016
but not among those who did not (see Supplementary Table 13). These results are inconsistent
with a simple hypothesis that news from untrustworthy websites crowds out hard news
consumption.
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Other claims concern potential effects on turnout and vote choice. While some have suggested
that Donald Trump won the 2016 election because of “fake news” 4,6, the most widely cited
evidence relies on a post-election survey showing a negative association between belief in false
claims about Hillary Clinton and self-reports of having voted for her among self-reported Obama
voters in 20127. However, self-reports of vote choice after the election are subject to recall error
and bias in self-reporting. More fundamentally, a post-election survey cannot establish that people
had even heard these claims before the election. As a result, any such association cannot be
interpreted as causal.
Given widespread interest in the claim that “fake news” helped win the election for Trump, we
consider whether any relationship exists between prior exposure to untrustworthy conservative
websites and two possible outcomes of interest — vote choice in our pre-election survey and a
validated measure of voter turnout provided by YouGov, which matched respondents to the
TargetSmart voter file. Our results are not sufficiently precise to offer definitive support for or
against that claim.
As Table 2 indicates, the relationships between exposure to untrustworthy conservative news and
changes in vote choice intention or turnout are imprecisely estimated for both low and high levels
of exposure overall (models 1 and 3) and when we distinguish between supporters of Trump and
Clinton supporters and respondents who were instead undecided or supported another candidate
in July 2016 (models 2 and 4). Equivalence tests reveal that we can only confidently rule out very
large effects on vote choice or turnout (ten percentage points or more for Trump support and nine
percentage points for turnout; see the Supplementary Information for further details).
18
Discussion
This paper provides systematic evidence of differential exposure to a key form of false or dubious
political information during a real-world election campaign: untrustworthy liberal and
conservative websites during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Our data, which do not rely on
post-election survey recall or forced exposure to “fake news” content, indicate that less than half
of all Americans visited an untrustworthy website in the weeks before the election and that these
websites make up a small percentage of people’s online news diets. However, we find evidence of
substantial selective exposure — in particular, Trump supporters differentially consuming news
from untrustworthy conservative websites. This tendency was heavily concentrated among a
subset of Americans with conservative information diets. In this sense, “echo chambers” are deep
(52 articles from untrustworthy conservative websites on average in this subset) but they are also
narrow (the group consuming so much of this content represents only 20% of the public).
Our results also provide important evidence about the mechanisms by which factually dubious
news disseminates and the effectiveness of responses to it. Specifically, we find that Facebook
played an important role in directing people to untrustworthy websites — heavy Facebook users
were differentially likely to consume information from these sites, which was often immediately
preceded by a visit to Facebook. In addition, we show that fact-checking websites failed to
effectively reach visitors to untrustworthy websites — audience overlap was only partial at the
domain level and virtually non-existent for the fact-checks that could be matched to specific
articles.
Finally, we examine whether visiting untrustworthy websites affects other political behaviors. Our
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results indicate that consumption of untrustworthy websites does not decrease hard news
consumption. When it comes to turnout and vote choice, however, our results are imprecise and
can only rule out very large effect sizes.
Of course, our study only examines visits to untrustworthy websites via web browsers. It would be
desirable to observe exposure on mobile devices and social media platforms directly and to
measure consumption of forms of hyper-politicized media including hyperpartisan Twitter feeds
and Facebook groups, internet forums such as Reddit, more established but often factually
dubious websites, memes and other images relevant to political topics, and more traditional media
like talk radio and cable news. Future research should also employ designs that allow us to better
assess the effects of untrustworthy websites and other forms of misinformation more broadly. It is
also important to understand the role played by interpersonal discussion and other forms of
indirect communication in exposing people to both misinformation and fact-checking39. In
addition, though we find no measurable evidence of effects of consumption of news from
untrustworthy websites on news consumption, vote choice, or turnout, further study is necessary
to validate these findings and assess how it affects public debate, misperceptions, hostility toward
political opponents, and trust in government and journalism. The results presented here also focus
on one period of time; the effects of cumulative exposure to websites with factually questionable
content and other forms of misinformation deserve future attention40. Finally, further investigation
is necessary to understand the reasons for the differences we and other scholars observe in visits to
untrustworthy news websites by partisanship/ideology and age35,41.
We also acknowledge the difficulty of comprehensively assessing content accuracy at scale.
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Despite significant institutional resources, professional fact-checkers can only investigate a small
fraction of claims disseminated by media outlets42. Likewise, researchers are limited in their
ability to evaluate the accuracy of the large quantities of content that they observe respondents
consuming in behavioral data. Moreover, even if such an undertaking were feasible, it would not
be possible for us to fully resolve the well-known epistemological challenges inherent to the
enterprise of judging truth claims43,44. These constraints necessitate the use of site-level quality or
accuracy ratings like those employed in this study (i.e., the data we use to construct our list of
untrustworthy websites). By using expert, peer-reviewed determinations about the quality of
information provided by websites, we sidestep difficult disputes that often arise at a more granular
level of analysis. While not perfect, this procedure is transparent, replicable, and successfully
identifies sites that publish articles which are most likely to be found to be false by professional
fact-checkers.
Nonetheless, these results underscore the importance of directly studying exposure to
untrustworthy websites and other dubious information online. As other studies indicate, exposure
to these extreme forms of misinformation is concentrated among a subset of Americans who
consume this type of content in large quantities45. However, these small groups can help propel
dubious claims to widespread visibility online, potentially intensifying polarization and negative
affect. This pattern represents an important development in political information consumption.
Methods
This study was approved by the New York University Institutional Review Board (Protocol:
IRB-FY2017-149) and the Dartmouth Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects (Study:
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00029870). Informed consent was obtained from all participants, who also received incentives
from the survey company that collected the data.
Data for this study combine responses to an online public opinion survey of a national sample of
Americans with online traffic data collected passively from respondents’ computers. These data
were collected by the survey firm YouGov from members of their Pulse panel who provided
informed consent to allow anonymous tracking of their online data. The software tracks web
traffic (minus passwords and financial transactions) for all browsers installed on a user’s computer.
Users provide consent before installing the software and can turn it off or uninstall it at any time.
Identifying information is not collected.
Time-stamped URL-level web traffic data was recorded from October 7–November 14, 2016.
Survey data was collected on the YouGov survey platform from October 21–31, 2016
(approximately the middle of our online behavioral data collection period). YouGov also
appended additional variables to the data on voter turnout (from voter files updated after the 2016
election) and both prior candidate preference and Cognitive Reflection Test scores (from other
surveys taken by our respondents). We employ survey weights for the data to accurately represent
the adult population of the U.S. Data from the Facebook News Feed is not included due to
restrictions on the Facebook API. We also do not analyze mobile traffic data in the main text
because it is only available for 19% of respondents (n = 629) and does not capture the full URL of
each website visited; see the Online Appendix for details on the domain-level traffic patterns we
observe in that data.
This sample closely resembles the U.S. population in its demographic characteristics, privacy
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attitudes, and voter turnout behavior. Among the 3,251 survey respondents (a sample size that was
determined by budget constraints), 52% are female, 68% are non-Hispanic whites, and 29% have
a bachelor’s degree or higher when survey weights constructed by YouGov are applied to
approximate a nationally representative sample.
The data are likely to not be perfectly representative of the U.S. population due to the unusual
Pulse panel — people with less than a high school degree are underrepresented and the sample
tilts Democratic (42% Clinton versus 33% Trump on a vote intention question that included Gary
Johnson, Jill Stein, other, not sure, and probably won’t vote as options) — but the participants are
diverse and resemble the population on many dimensions.
This study specifically focuses on data from the 2,525 survey respondents for whom page-level
online traffic data from laptop or desktop computers are also available.
Table 3 provides a comparison of the demographic composition and political preferences of the
full Pulse sample and participants with online traffic data we analyze with the pre-election
American National Election Studies (ANES) face-to-face survey, a benchmark study that was also
conducted during the general election campaign. The set of respondents for whom we have
page-level online traffic data is demographically very similar to the full Pulse sample and closely
resembles the composition of the ANES sample. Two exceptions are preferences for Clinton and
intention to vote. However, the latter difference is contradicted by turnout data: 56.6% of
respondents for whom online traffic data were available were recorded as voting in the 2016
general election according to the TargetSmart voter file data matched to our respondents by
YouGov, which corresponds closely to the U.S. voting-age population turnout rate of 54.7% for
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2016 46. Another distinction concerns technology usage. The Pulse sample has somewhat higher
levels of home internet access (presumably 100%) compared with the ANES sample (89%). In
addition, we note that our sample seems to demonstrate modestly higher levels of Facebook usage
than the American public — 88% visited a Facebook URL at least once and 76% did so more than
ten times in our sample period compared with 62% of Americans interviewed in the 2016
American National Election Studies face-to-face survey who said they had a Facebook account
and had used it in the last month. However, our measures potentially also capture visits to
Facebook pages by individuals who do not have an account.
This study considers the relationship between the demographic and attitudinal variables measured
in our survey data, the information consumption behavior observed in our web traffic data, and
behavioral data on voter turnout by participants. Specifically, we both identify the demographic
and attitudinal correlates of consumption of news from untrustworthy websites and analyze the
association between this consumption and relevant behaviors (news consumption, voter turnout,
and vote choice). We focus specifically in this study on respondents who reported supporting
Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump in our survey (76% of our sample) because of our focus on
selective exposure by candidate preference.
Studying consumption of untrustworthy websites requires defining which websites frequently
publish factually dubious or untrustworthy content. Following previous research35,41, we use a
domain-level approach to measurement. Our goal is to analyze consumption of news from
untrustworthy sources rather than exposure to false information per se— a necessity given the
impossibility of assessing the accuracy of all information that people encounter about politics. We
specifically seek to identify websites that “lack the news media’s editorial norms and processes for
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ensuring the accuracy and credibility of information”47. The qualifying untrustworthy websites
considered in this study are those classified as “black” (382 websites), “orange” (47 websites), and
“red” (61 websites) by Grinberg et al.35 The “black” sites were those previously identified by
journalists and fact-checkers as notable publishers of false or misleading content. Grinberg et al.
also classified sites as “orange (negligent or deceptive)” or “red (little regard for the truth)” using
human annotation of website editorial practices among sites fact-checked by Snopes or that were
frequently mentioned in their Twitter data35.
There are of course many lists of untrustworthy online content, but we present robustness tests in
the Supplementary Information using two alternate outcome measures that yield results which are
highly consistent with those presented in Table 1. First, we show that results are highly similar
using an alternative domain-level measure: domains identified by Allcott and Gentzkow3 as
frequently publishing dubious information that were created soon before the 2016 election and
overwhelmingly supported one of the two major candidates. Second, we show that our results are
also highly similar for a measure of exposure to articles from the Grinberg et al.35 set of
untrustworthy websites that were specifically fact-checked and found to be false or misleading.
Finally, we also validate our preferred classification of untrustworthy websites in the
Supplementary Information by merging the Grinberg et al.35 designations with data on
professional fact-checks. Reassuringly, we find that over 93% of articles from any of the three
untrustworthy categories (black, red, and orange) were determined to be false, a proportion that is
substantially higher than what we observe for articles from domains not in these categories.
We thus measure whether people visited one of the qualifying websites (a binary measure) as well
as the fraction of people’s diet of news and information that came from these sites (a proportion)
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both overall and for those that Grinberg et al.35 could classify as liberal or conservative based on
site exposure patterns (see their Supplementary Materials for details). Table S2 provides a list of
the untrustworthy sites most frequently visited by respondents in our sample, their quality rating,
and their slant classification. As in numerous other studies of this topic3,35, 41, 48, we find
ideological/partisan asymmetries in the set of untrustworthy news websites respondents visited
and how much traffic they received. This asymmetry thus does not appear to be a measurement
artifact. The reasons we observe such an asymmetry are beyond the scope of this study, however,
and should be investigated in future research.
Additionally, we compute two key explanatory measures from web traffic data. First, following
Guess (N.d.), we measure the overall ideological slant of respondents’ online media consumption
(or “information diet”) by calculating the average slant of the websites they visit, which are based
on differential sharing of websites by self-identified liberals versus conservatives on Facebook21.
We then divide our sample into ten equally-sized groups (deciles) ranging from the 10% of
respondents with the most liberal information diets to the 10% with the most conservative
information diets. We choose deciles given the evidence of substantial within-party heterogeneity
in selective exposure and other relevant political behaviors49. These deciles correspond to
meaningful differences in political attitudes and behavior. For instance, 89% of Americans in the
most conservative decile of media consumption preferred Trump to Clinton (95% CI:
81.6%–96.8%). This group consumed a median of eight articles from Fox during the study period
and the top quartile read between 136 and 1611.
Finally, we measure respondent consumption of “hard news” sites classified by a topic model as
focusing on national news, politics, or world affairs21. We sum this measure with total
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consumption of untrustworthy websites as defined above to construct the denominator for the
estimated proportion of people’s news and information diet coming from untrustworthy websites.
In our statistical analyses, we use OLS models due to their simplicity, ease of interpretation, and
robustness to misspecification50, but we demonstrate in the Supplementary Information that the
conclusions for our binary exposure measures are consistent if estimated using a probit model.
We have not formally tested whether the assumptions of OLS have been met.
Data availability
Data files necessary to replicate the results in this article are available at the following Dataverse
repository: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YLW1AZ.
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Table 2: Correlates of Trump support and voter turnout in the 2016 election
Trump support Voter turnout
b s.e. p 95% CI b s.e. p 95% CI
Clinton supporter (July) -0.19 0.04 0.00 -0.26, -0.12 -0.05 0.04 0.25 -0.14, 0.04
Trump supporter (July) 0.69 0.04 0.00 0.61, 0.78 -0.06 0.04 0.12 -0.13, 0.02
Untrustworthy conservative website exposure (binary) 0.05 0.03 0.08 -0.01, 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.23 -0.02, 0.10
Liberal information diet -0.05 0.03 0.09 -0.10, 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.33 -0.04, 0.12
Conservative information diet 0.01 0.02 0.78 -0.04, 0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.43 -0.10, 0.04
Political knowledge -0.01 0.01 0.28 -0.02, 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.36 -0.03, 0.01
Political interest 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01, 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.47 -0.03, 0.06
College -0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.11, -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.44 -0.08, 0.03
Female -0.01 0.02 0.54 -0.06, 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.93 -0.06, 0.06
Nonwhite -0.01 0.03 0.69 -0.08, 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.59 -0.10, 0.05
Age 30–44 0.07 0.05 0.11 -0.02, 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.26 -0.04, 0.15
Age 45–59 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.00, 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.29 -0.05, 0.16
Age 60+ 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.04, 0.21 0.03 0.04 0.46 -0.05, 0.12
Constant 0.07 0.09 0.42 -0.10, 0.25 0.24 0.08 0.00 0.08, 0.40
Controls for past turnout No Yes
R2 0.77 0.53
N 1715 1715
OLS models with survey weights (p-values two-sided). Online traffic statistics for October 7–21, 2016 among YouGov Pulse panel members. Trump
support was measured in a survey conducted October 21–31, 2016. YouGov matched validated vote data from TargetSmart to survey respondents.
“Controls for past turnout” are separate indicators for voting in the 2012 presidential primaries, the 2016 presidential primaries, and the 2012 general
election (see the Supplementary Information for full results).
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Table 3: Demographics of respondents
ANES Full Pulse Laptop/desktop Mobile data
FTF sample data available available
Candidate preference
Trump 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.27
Clinton 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.47
Other/DK/won’t vote 0.32 0.24 0.24 0.25
Age
18-29 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.27
30-44 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.34
45-59 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.25
60+ 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.13
Race
White 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.65
Black 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
Hispanic 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.16
Asian 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Sex
Male 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.45
Female 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.55
N 1181 3251 2525 660
Respondents are participants in the 2016 American National Election Studies pre-election face-to-face study (ANES
FTF) and YouGov Pulse panel members. The columns of YouGov Pulse data are not mutually exclusive — the third
and fourth columns represent differing subsets of the full Pulse sample. Estimates calculated using survey weights.
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